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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Volume XXIII May, 1935 Number 4
TESTAMENTARY REVOCATION BY ACT TO THE
DOCUMENT AND DEPENDENT RELATIVE
REVOCATION
By ALVIN E. EvAs*
A will under the Statute of Frauds may be revoked by
burning, cancellation, tearing, or obliterating, and under the
Wills Act by burning, tearing, or otherwise destroying. It is
commonly assumed that the difference in" wording is without
effect in this country. Most American states follow one or the
other English statutes or combine the two, or make unimportant
alterations. Thus, while the Indiana statute provides for revoca-
tion by destruction or mutilation, the court finds that there is no
essential difference between this provision and that of the Statute
of Frauds.' In New Mexico and Tennessee, no statutory pro-
vision is made for revocation by act to the document.2 In almost
all the states the act, if performed by another, must be done
in the presence of the testato and by his direction.3
* Dean, University of Kentucky College of Law.
See Woodfill v. Patton, 76 Ind. 575 (1881); Burns Indiana Stat-
utes Annotated (1933), Sec. 7-301; Bordwell gives a full account of
the distinctions, 14 Ia. L. Rev. 1, 287 (1929).
2 See Ford v. Ford, 26 Tenn. 94 (1846) (intent to revoke, accom-
panied by direction to burn, equals a revocation, even if the act is not
performed); Smiley -v. Gambit, 39 Tenn. 164 (1858) (burning wrong
instrument with intent to revoke the will is a revocation).
8Miller v. Harrell, 175 Ky. 578, 194 S. W. 782 (1917) (Destruction
by testator's instructions but beyond his presence not a revocation, and
the act cannot later be ratified); see Bordwell, op. cit., p. 289.
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1. THE VARIOUs ACTS TO THE DOCUMENT
There is no essential difference between cancellation and
obliteration.4 The former means etymologically to draw criss-
cross lines (cancelli, lattice or cross-bars), and the latter (ob
litteram, against the letter) means the drawing of a line through,
or the pasting of some obstruction over words intended to be
revoked. Indeed, an erasure may also be an obliteration, but
it-is also regarded as a species of tearing or cutting. To mu-
tilate means to obliterate, cancel, cut or scratch out, tear, or
erase and is a method adapted to partial or total revocation.5
Tearing, and especially burning, are better suited to complete
revocation, whereas cancellations, interlineations and oblitera-
tions are specially suited to partial revocation. Yet, oblitera-
tion and cancellation may affect the entire will,( and tearing
may affect only the part torn off.7
Obliteration of the name of one legatee cannot operate as
an entire revocation, even though that result was intended.
The act is 'not appropriate to show such intent.8 But the oblit-
eration of an essential feature of a will such as the testator's sig-
'Jeffett v. Cook, 175 Ark. 369, 299 S. W. 389 (1927); see 9 Va. L.
Rev. 98, where Mr. Battle regards the word "obliteration" as having
been derived from "oblinere", to daub.
5Woodfill v. Patton, supra, n. 1.
8 Townley v. Watson, 3 Curt. Eccl. 761 (1844); Giles v. Warren,
L. R. 2 P. & D. 401 (1872).
'Hartz v. Sobel, 136 Ga. 565, 71 S. E. 995 (1911) (will cut in.many
places in order to effect a partial revocation); Goods of Woodward,
L, R. 2 P. & D. 206 (1871) (eight lines torn from the first page and
remainder preserved).
8Law v. Law, 83 Ala. 432, 3 So. 752 (1888); see also Safe Deposit
Oo. v. Thom, 117 Md. 954, 83 A. 45 (1912) (Revocation of one item by
erasure not appropriate as an entire revocation). But in Damman v.
Damman, 28 A. 408 (Md. 1894), will was so marked up with partial
revocations, though some items were untouched, that court held entire
will was revoked. See also Muh's Succession, 35 La. Ann. 394 (1883);
Fisher's Estate, 283 Pa. 282, 129 A. 90 (1925). This sort of judicial
revocation Is unjustifiable. In Triplett v. Triplett, 161 Va. 906, 172
S. E. 162 (1934), it was held that an attestdd holographic will could not
be probated as an attested will where the only significant erasures and
alterations were partial revocations, e. g., the amount of the annual
salary to testator's manager having been erased and another sum sub-
stituted, and the name of one additional trustee being added, were
regarded as a total revocation. Clearly there was no total revocation.
It was important that the attested will be sustained because testator
owned land In Florida which could not pass by an unattested will.
See criticism in 21 Va. L. Rev. 342 (1935).
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nature is an entire revocation, 9 though it is a question for the
jury whether the testator intended to revoke his will by the
cancellation of his signature.10 In Iowa cancellation is not
equivalent to destruction and is ineffective unless attested or,
unless the act amounts to a complete obscuration of the part
intended to be revoked. 1 Partial cancellation with pencil is
regarded as only a deliberative act in England and alone is not
sufficient to alter the will,12 but the rule is generally contra in
the United States,' 3 and a partial revocation in most states may
be made by such a cancellation. 14 If the testator cancels a de-
scriptive term like "my son", leaving the name intact, there is
no revocation.' 5
Though to cancel means to make criss-cross lines, as in
lattice work, still the lines may not even cross each other and
they need not be straight.16 Thus, they may form letters and
words or sentences and by the expression of the thought of the
testator may show even more clearly his intent to revoke. But
such words written upon the face of a will are usually not suffi-
cient as a revocatory writing, because they are not attested.
Under what circumstances may they be effective as a can-
cellation? Assuming a jurisdiction which admits of total or
partial revocation by cancellation, it should be sufficient if such
9Jeffett v. Cook, supra, n. 4; Olmread's Estate, 122 Cal. 224, 54 P.
745 (1898); Glass v. Scott, 14 Col. App. 377, 60 P. 186 (1900) (lines
drawn through signature and intention to revoke declared to wit-
nesses); McIntyre v. McIntyre, 120 Ga. 67, 47 S. E. 501 (1904). So
cutting out the signature is a revocation, Youse v. Foreman, 68 Ky.
337 (1869).
2"Re Hopkins, 172 N. Y. 360, 65 N. E. 173 (1902).
" Gay v. Gay, 60 Ia. 415o'14 N. W. 238 (1882); Richardson v. Baird,
126 Ia. 408, 102 N. W. 128 (1905) (probate of all that is legible). Note
the similarity to the requirements of the English Wills Act.
"*Francis v. Grover, 5 Hare 39 (1845); Goods of Hall, L. R. 2
P. & D. 256 (1871).
'zMcIntyre v. McIntyre, 120 Ga. 67, 47 S. E. 501 (1904); Hilyard v.
Wood, 71 N. J. Eq. 214, 63 A. 7 (1906); Frothingham's Will, 75 N. J. Eq.
205, 71 A. 695 (1908); Tomlinson's Estate, 133 Pa. 249, 19 A. 482
(1890).
"Wikman's Estate, 148 Cal. 642, 84 P. 212 (1906);Stuart v. Mc-
Whorter, 238 Ky. 82 (1931) (will traced to testator's possession, exe-
cutor's name being cancelled). This was the rule in England up to the
Wills Act. Thereafter, if a will was found showing an act of revoca-
tion, the burden of proof was upon the one who asserted that the
revocation was done prior to the Wills Act, after which cancellatidn
was Insufficient If the cancelled part was still "apparent"; Benson, v.
Benson, L. R. 2 P. & D. 172 (1870).
iClark v. Smith, 34 Barb. 140 (N. Y. 1861).
" See Thompson v. Royall, 175 S. E. 748 (Va. 1934).
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words as "this will is revoked" or any similar words, were
written upon the face of the instrument in a place where words
of the will appear, at least if they are so placed as- to indicate
whether the revocation is partial or total.' 7 The will consists
of the substratum paper and the distribution of ink or lead
upon it forming words. The margins and the back are not
properly a part of the will, and revocatory declarations on
them do not cancel the will, though a will could not exist with-
out margins or back.' 8 Where partial revocation is not allowed
a note on the margin would, of course, be ineffective,19 but the
same rule holds as to total revocation.20
Cutting2 ' and scratching out, or other erasure with an in-
strument 22 are equivalent to tearing and so are embraced with-
in the statute. It seems that tearing off even an inconsequen-
tial part of the will such as a seal, if done with intent to revoke
totally, is sufficient where the instrument is referred to as
sealed.23 The tearing out of any essential part of the will, such
as testator's signature or those of the attesters, shows an in-
tent to revoke totally.2 4
11 Norsen v. Erkenswick, 298 Il. 231, 131 N. E. 622 (1921); but see
Evans' Appeal, 58 Pa. St. 238 (1868). See note in 3 A. L. R. 833, 837
and 31 Y. L. Jour. 892 (1922).
"Howard v. Hunter, 115 Ga. 357, 41 S. E. 638 (1902), Note
A. L. R. 833; Oetjen v. Oetjen, 115 Ga. 1004, 42 S. E. 387 (1902);
Dowling v. Gilleland, 286 I1. 530, 122 N. E. 70 (1919); Sanderson v.
Norcross, 242 Mass. 43, 136 N. E. 170 (1922); In re Shelton's Will, 143
N. C. 218, 55 S. B. 705, 10 A. C. 531 (1906), see 3 A. L. R. 833, 14
A. L. R. 1018; Lewis v. Lewis, 2 Watts & S. 445 (1841); Will of Ladd,
60 Wis. 187, 18 N. W. 734 (1884); Cheese v. Lovejoy, L. R. 2 P. & D. 251
(1876). Contra, Warner v. Warner, 37 Vt. 356 (1864), and also Billing-
ton v. Jones, 108 Tenn. 234, 66 S. W. 1127 (1901); 56 L. R. A. 654,
and 91 A. S. R. 751 notes.
Il "Gugel v. Vollmer, 1 Dem. 484 (N. Y. Sur. 1883).
"Akers' Will, 77 N. Y. S. 643 (1902), affirmed 173 N. Y. 620.
SGoods of Bleckley, L. R. 8 P. D. 169 (1883); Hobbs v. Knight,
1 Curt. 769 (1838); Sanders v. Babbitt, 106 Ky. 646, 51 S. W. 163 (1899)
(statute adds cutting).
2 Goods of Morton, L. R. 12 P. D. 141 (1887); Hobbs v. Knight,
1 Curt. 769 (1838).
I White's Will, 25 N. J. Eq. 501 (1874) (seal and part of name
torn off); Price v. Powell, 3 H. & N. 341 (Bxch. 1858); Williains v.
Tyiey, 5 Jur. N. S. 530 (P. & M. 1858).
"Evans v. Dallow, 31 L. J. (P. & M) 128 (1862) (signature ot
attestors torn off); Abraham v. Joseph, 5 Jur. N. S. 179 (Ece., 1859)
(same); Williams v. Tyley, supra, n. 23 (testator's signature torn off)
is confusing. The court observes that there is no presumption either
way as to the time when interlineations are made and so the burden
of proof falls upon the one who asserts that they were made prior to
execution. The court makes no distinction between the two uses of
Interlineations, one at least being made to fill a blank, and others to,
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It seems that while tearing his will or immediately there-
after, the testator may change his mind and the will is not re-
voked by the tearing. Thus, even if it is torn in bits by the
testator due to information which he decides was erroneous
while still employed in the act, he may paste these bits together
and preserve the will. 25 Nor is a will revoked, though so torn
that a portion is almost torn off if testator changes his mind
before the act is completed. 20  Mere tearing sheets apart that
have been attached inter se in some fashion does not show an,
intent to revoke.27 It seems to be the better rule that the tear-
ing out of one or some of several sheets does not work a total
revocation. 28 Just as a will need not be torn into bits in order
to be revoked, so revocation by burning does not require annihi-
lation. In fact, any slight degree of burning or even singeing-
make additions and corrections. The use of a different colored ink
from that in the original is properly, used as the basis of an inference
that the corrections were made subsequent to execution.
G6ies v. Warren, L. R. 2 P. & D. 401 (1872). See also Wood's Will,
11 N. Y. S. 157 (Sur., 1889) (lines drawn through testator's signature,
then these lines and the signature partially erased and signature re-
written in ink of a different color); Sellards v. Kirby, 82 Kan. 291, 108
P. 73 (1910) (signature partly scratched out and written in again with
pencil-no evidence as to order of events-no revocation); Safe De-
posit Co. v. Thorn, 117 Md. 154, 83 A. 45 (1912) (simliar. Court also
alternately resorts to dependent relative revocation doctrine). But
if the signature has once been cut out and later gummed in, the will
is revoked, the gumming in being an invalid attempt at revival; Bell,
v. Fothergill, L. R. 2 P. & D. 148 (1870).
2Doe v. Perkes, 3 B. & Ald. 489 (K. B., 1820); Elms v. Elms, 1
Sw. & Tr. 155 (Eccl., 1858). But see Goods of Colberg, 2 Curt. 832(Eccl., 1841), where testator repented at a later time. In Throck-
morton v. Holt, 180 U. S. 552 (1900), a will torn nearly in two "and
burnt at the margins was not revoked. "But even if it had been found
among testator's papers, we incline to think some further evidence be-
yond its present appearance would be necessary to show he intended
to cancel it." So in Russell v. Tyler, 224 Ky. 511, 6 S. W. (2d). 707(1928), preservation of mutilated will is regarded as inconsistent
with an intent totally to revoke.
"Woodruff v. Hunuley, 127 Ala. 640, 29 So. 98, 85 A. L. R. 145-(1900). But tearing off a sheet which contains all the other disposi-
tions, leaving only the residuary clause on the second sheet, works a
total revocation, Henry v. Fraser, 29 Fed. (2d) 633 (D. C., 1928).
"Bescher's Estate, 229 N. Y. S. 821 (Sup., 1928) (Partial revoca-
tion inadmissible save when the contents of the removed part cannot
be proved); Clarke v. Scripps, 2 Rob. 563 (Eccl., 1852) (testator seems
to have torn off more than he intended to and then reannexed it). In
England, however, it has been held, in Treloar v. Lean, 14 P. D. *(1889), and Leonard v. Leonard (1902), P. 243, that the removal of
three of five sheets and the substitution of three others revoked the.
entire will. See I Jarman on Wills (7th ed., 1930), p. 131.
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some part of the script which affects the physical integrity of
the instrument is sufficient. 29
The English Act declaring a will is not revoked in any
part save where the original provisions are -not apparent applies
'only to obliterations (including the pasting of an obstruction
over the writing), interlineations or other alterations and so
-applies to erasures where the original can still be read with
mechanical aids, but does not apply to burning nor to the
form of tearing where an entire portion of the substratum is
removed. If the erased portion is legible by means of a glass,
it is "apparent". " Where an obstruction is pasted over words
-of the will it is not the function of the court to render the
,words so obscured "apparent" by removing the obstruction,3 '
unless the court conceives that the problem is one not of abso-
'lute but of dependent relative revocation, in which latter case
-the obstruction may be removed to secure evidence of the orig-
inal provision:32 In this country, where section xxi of the
English Act has not been adopted, the erasure need not make
the words illegible to show the intent to revoke.33
There are at least two sorts of interlineations, or rather
-there may be two different purposes which testators may desire
to accomplish by interlineations: (a) they may desire to fill in
actual blanks left when the will was drawn, or inadvertent
-omissions in the expression, or (b) they may wish to alter or
:add to a will already completed. in the former case it is the
common view, both *here and in England, that the addition-is
2 White v. Casten, 46 N. C. 197 (1853) (Signed at top, bottom
-and in the creases where it was folded); Johnson v. BrailsforZ, 11
S. C. L. 272 (1820); Bibb v. Thomas, 2 W. B1. 1043 (K. B., 1715).
:Singeing the envelope is insufficient, Doe v. Harris, 6 A. & E. 209
(K. B., 1837).
30 Goods of McCabe, L. R. 3 P. & D. 94 (1873); Goods of Braisier
[1898), P. 36, or by a peculiar arrangement of the light, In re She~ton's
Wil, supra, n. 18; I Jarman 147.
U Goods of Horsford, L. R. 3 P. & D. 211 (1874); Flinch v. Coombe
(1894), P. 191.
Goods of Horsford, supra, n. 31.
" Woodfill v. Patton, supra, n. 1 (Erasures and cancellations are
-mutilations); Bigelow v. GiElott, 123 Mass. 102 (1877). In Pennsylvania
it seems that an erasure is ineffective when not proved to have been
dlone at the direction of testator by more than one witness and the
. ntlre will falls if the original cannot be proved. Simrell's Estate,
154 Pa. 604, 26 A. 599 (1893).
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presumed to have been made prior to execution.3 4 On the other
hand, interlineations made to alter a completed expression of
will are presumed to have been made after execution.35
THE EFFECT oF REVOCATION OF THE WILL op CODICIL INTER SE.
The relationship between a will and its codicils is often.
tested by a revocatory act done to either will or codicil and the
question is what effect does the act to the one instrument have.
upon the other. The result is, to some extent, affected by the-
further question whether or not they are executed as separate
papers. It is agreed that the revocation of a separate codicil
does not revoke the will,36 even though the will may have been
revived by the codicil and thus have depended upon it for any-
effect which it has.37 But the will stands as modified by the
revoked codicil, that is (at least in jurisdictions where a will is.
not revived by the revocation of the revoking will) the removal
"Martin v. Martin, 334 Ill. 115, 165 N. E. 644 (1929); Mundy v.
Mundy, 15 N. J. Eq. 290 (1858); Smith v. Runkle, 97 A. 296 (N. J.
Prerog., 1915), Woerner, Sec. 49; Grossman v. Grossman, 95 N. Y. 145
(1884) (interlineation to make one an exact duplicate of the other);
Guerin v. Hunt, 118 S. C. 32, 110 S. E. 71 (1921); KelIJ v. Charmer,.
23 Bea. 195 (Rolls Ct., 1856); I Jarman 144; Triplett v. Triplett, 161
Va. 906, 172 S. E. 162 (1934), is confusing. The court observes that.
there is no presumption either way as to the time when interlineations
are made and so the burden.of proof falls upon the one who asserts.
that they were made prior to execution. The court makes no distinc-
tion between the two different uses of interlineations, one at least being
made to fill a blank, and others to make additions and corrections
The use of a different colored ink from that in the original is properly
used as the basis of an inference that the corrections were made sub-
sequent to execution.
See preceding note and Wells v. Wells, 20 Ky. 152 (1826); Quinn.
v. Quinn, 1 Thomp. & C. 437 (N. Y., 1873); Dyer v. Erving, 2 Dem. 160
(Sur. N. Y., 1884); Stevens' Will, 3 N. Y. S. 131 (Sur., 1888); Carver's
Will, 23 N. Y. S. 753 (Sur., 1893); Lushington v. Onslow, 6 N. of C. 183(Ch., 1848); Doherty v. Dwyer, 25 L. R. Ir. 297 (Eq. 1890). But see.
Succession of Guiraud, 164 La. 620, 114 So. 489 (1927); Perrot v. Perrot,
14 East. 23 (K. B., 1811); Smith's Estate, 2 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 626 (1887).
Proof that interlineations of the second type were made prior to ex--
ecution by oral evidence was allowed in Mundy v. Mundy, supra, n. 34,
and Ackerman's Will, 114 N. Y. S. 197 (App. D., 1908); City National
Bank v. Slocum, 272 Fed. 11 (C. C. A., 1921). A properly executed!
interlineation may amount to a codicil, Smith's Estate, supra.
"Gddings v. Giddings, 65 Conn. 149, 32 A. 334 (1894); Page on
Wills (2d ed., 1926), Sec. 416. See also Malone v. Hobbs, 40 Va, 349.(1842) (leading American case).
"Cable's Will, 206 N. Y. S. 501 (1924); James v. Shrimpton, L. PL
1 P. D. 431 (1876).
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-of the codicil does not revive provisions in the will revoked by
the codicil.38
In Black v. Jobling,30 Lord Penzance gave a historical
sketch of the relationship of codicils to the wills of which they
-were a part and examined the question of the revocation of the
-codicil by the mere revocation of the will. He showed that
under the Statute of Frauds (no devise nor any clause thereof
shall be revocable save by . . . . ) the coufts had reached no
Ainal conclusion as to the matter, though generally there was a
prima facie presumption of revocation.40  Under the Wills Act
(no will or codicil or any part shall be revoked), such implied
revocations were clearly eliminated. 4 1 Lord Penzance also held
the codicil was not revoked by revocation of the will, if executed
separately, even though apart from the will it became unin-
telligible. 42 This is a sound view and the instrument should be
probated and left to a court of construction.- However, it has
'been said in England that a plea that testator in revoking his
will intended to revoke the codicils (executed separately from
the will) was good.43 In Pennsylvania a codicil is presumably
revoked by the revocation of the will, but evidence to the con-
trary is admissible. Thus, in Pepper's Estate,44 the codicil ap-
pointed an executor only, but he had predeceased the testator.
'The will, if not republished by the codicil was invalid and the
-conclusion reached was that the codicil fell with the will. This
result seems unjustifiable,4 5 and to conflict with the statute.
Is Osburn v. Rochester Trust Co., 46 L. N. S. 983 1913); Cable's
-Will, supra, n. 37. See 40 Harv. L. Rev. 71, 79-82 1925); Ann. Cas.
1912 A 834; same, 1913 D; ib. 1915 A 102, note; 46 L. R. A. i(ns) 983.
note; 38 A. L. R. 245-6, note; Mundy v. Mundy, supra, n. 34.
IBlack v. Jobling, L. R. 1 P. & D. 685 (1869).
4Medlycott v. Assheton, 2 Add. 229, 162 Rep. 278 (Eccl., 1824)
But there are cases where it is so independent and unconnected that
it may stand alone. So here in Taggart v. Hooper, 1 Curt. 289 (Eccl.,
1836), and in Barrow v. Barrow, 2 Phill. 335, 161 Eng. Reprint 360(Reel., 1756) (a separate codicil making independent provisions not
-revoked).
41 Cogstoun v. Walcott, 5 N. C. 623 (V. Ch., 1843); Griweood v.
,Cozens, 2 Sw. & Tr. 364 (Beel., 1859); Goods of Savage, L. R. 2 P & D.
78 (1870); Gardiner v. Courthope, L. R. 12 P. D. 14 (1886); Paige v.
,Brooks, 75 L. T. N. S. 455 (1896). See I Jarman 141-2; 1 Page, See. 415.
Goods of Turner, L & R. 2 P. & D. 403 (1872).
Sugde7 v. Lord St. Leonards, L. R. 1 P. D. 154, 205-6 (1876).
"Pepper's Estate, 148 Pa. St. 5, 23 A. 1039 (1892).
"Where the codicil is in effect a new will, however, it does not
,perish with the earlier will, Smith's Estate, supra, n. 35.
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The American cases, apart from those in Pennsylvania, follow in
general the rule of Black v. Jobling.
There remains the case where will and codicil are part of
the same document, the latter being executed at the foot of the
will or on the margin. The great weight of authority regards
such a will and codicil as a single instrument, so that the revoca-
tion of one revokes the other also,48 or if one stands while the
other is revoked, a partial revocation of the entire instrument
occurs.
It seems wise to regard wills and codicils as separate in-
struments when executed separately and as a single instrument
save as to the date of execution when the codicil appears on the
margin or at the foot of a will. Thus, a separate codicil is never
revoked save by appropriate act to itself. Whether due to its
dependence on the wording of the revoked will, it can have
independent significance is a matter of construction, and that
is not of primary interest to the probate court. Some states
have provided by legislation that a codicil shall in all cases be
revoked when the will is revoked. 47 But such legislation is on
the whole undesirable, first because there is no sufficient reason
to suppose that testator meant to revoke a separate codicil by
revoking his will unless he so declares in the appropriate man-
ner; next because an instrument may be called by the testator
a codicil, which is in no proper sense a codicil, but is rather a
later will,48 and an instrument may be called a will which is
46Burton v. Wyde, 261 Ill. 397, 103 N. E. 976 (1913) (signature to
codicil on fourth page of will cut out. Parol evidence showed testator
intended to revoke entire will); Youse v. Forman, 68 Ky. 337 (1869)
(codicil on margin depending on the will for interpretation revoked
by revoking the will); Re Broolcman, 33 N. Y. S. 575 (Sur., 1895);
A. C. 1915 A 102, note; 38 A. L. R. 244, note; Francis' Will, 132 N. Y. S.
695 (Sur., 1911) (codicil under same cover as will); Christmas v.
Whinyates, 3 Sw. & Tr. 81 (Ecc., 1863) (Will and codicil one instru-
ment but nature of tearing showed intent to revoke partially); Goods
of Bleckley, L. R. 8 P. & D. 169 (1883). A codicil on the back of a will
was not recorded where contrary intention shown; Goods of Harris,
3 Sw. & Tr. 485 (Eccl. 1864).
41 See Deering's Probate Code of California (1931), Sec. 79;
Idaho Code Annotated (1932), Sec. 14-318; Compiled Laws of North
Dakota (1913), Sec. 5673; Oklahoma Statutes (1931), Sec. 1568; Rev.
St. of Utah (1933), See. 101-1-30.
" Smith's Estate, supra, n. 35; Bingaman's Estate, 281 Pa. 497,
127 A. 73 (1924); Osborn, v. Rochester Deposit Co., 209 N. Y. 54, 102
N. E. 571 (1912); for codicils called wills see Gelbke v. Gelbee, 88 Ala.
427, 6 So. 834 (1889); Grubb's Estate, 174 Pa. 187, 34 A. 573 (1896);
Owens v. Fahenstock, 110 S. C. 130, 96 S. E. 557 (1918); Collns v.
Eltstone (1893). P. 1. Cf. Goods of Bonner, L. R. 21 Ir. R. 339 (Ch. &
P. D., 1888).
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merely a codicil. Would either of these be revoked under the
statute? Such a statute puts a court in a quandary in these
cases and on the whole creates more uncertainty than certainty.
DUPLICATES
The practice of retaining a copy of an instrument at the
time of executing it has been carried over into the drafting of
wills. A mere copy is thus evidence of the contents of the
original, but an executed copy is itself an original. A carbon
copy is an exact duplicate. Where there are duplicate wills in
suo manu, the order of attesting may vary between the two, or
there may be a different set of attesters. If one bears a date
diferent from that of the other, they are not duplicates in fact
and the earlier one is revoked by the later one to the extent
that they are not wholly consistent and the earlier one becomes
inoperative to the extent that they are alike.4 9 A duplicate,
whether it be exact or not, should make precisely the same dis-
position and have precisely the same effect, or it is by hypothesis
not a duplicate,50 the alter ego of its fellow. If one is a carbon,
perhaps it might be called a copy rather than an original, but
the question which is original and which the copy should be
wholly unimportant if the two are in fact or effect duplicates,
and both are executed. Two wills of the same date, both being
executed, are not necessarily duplicates, and if they differ,
both should be probated.51  To the extent that they conflict,
there will be no will unless evidence is forthcoming to indicate
which is later in time and neither will be effective in such case
save as it is in harmony with the other.5 2 Two wills, however,
may bear the same date, and one may be in effect a codicil to the
other.9 3
IO'Nea77 v. Farr, 1 Rich. L. 80 (S. C., 1844) (dictum), but see
Doe v. Striclkand. 8 Com. B. 724 (1849), where jury found that later
will was intended as a duplicate and so as part of the earlier will and
was revoked to the extent that the earlier one had been revoked.
And see Hubbard v. Alexander, L. R. 3 Oh. D. 738 (1876).
* St. Mary's v. Masterson, 122 S. W. 587- (Tex. Civ. App., 1909)
'(Some variation between wills executed same day and each contained
a revocatory clause. Intrinsic evidence showed which was later and
the earlier one was held revoked).
m Cousinery's Estate, 13 Pa. Dist. R. 224 (1904).
2St. Mary's Orphan Asylum v. Masterson, supra, n. 50. See 22
Ky. Law Jour. 469, 479 (1934).
13 Goods of Bonner, supra, n. 48 (First will appointed executors;
second one disposed of property); Grubb's Estate, supra, n. 48. (Three
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Where wills are exact duplicates, it is believed that only
one should be probated because only one should have effect.
54
Thus, all question of cumulation is avoided,5 5 because they are
duplicates, but if they are of the same date and differ from each
other, both must be proved.5 6 There may arise in such case
the possibility of cumulation, for when a general legacy is given
by one instrument and the same amount is given by another
instrument in the absence of a contrary intent, the provisions
are cumulative. 57
Where one of the duplicates is in the hands of the testator
and the other in the custody of another, such as testator's bank
or his attorney, and the one in his possession is revoked, pre-
sumably both are revoked. 58 But the presumption is rebuttable
by evidence, the testator's declarations being sufficient for that
purpose,59 and the question of intent should be left to the
wills of same date, first gave certain property to A; second gave the
remainder to B and C; and third declared that the husband should
have nothing.)
"Grossman v. Grossman, supra, n. 34 (an interlineation of a for-
gotten item to make it like the other); In Furber's Estate, 22 Pa. Dist.
R. 987, see 67 Pa. L. Rev. 195 (1913), both copies were required to be
probated, but the precedents followed were not applicable, since they
dealt with wills executed at same time but entirely different in con-
tent, in which event all are to be probated and construed.
6Hubbard v. Alexander, supra, n. 49.
"Grossman v. Grossman, supra, n. 34; Re Forman's Will, 54 Barb.
274 (N. Y., 1869) (Two wills same date In some respects repugnant
to each other, must both be probated).
O'Hubbard v. Alexander, supra, n. 49.
" Walsh's Estate, 196 Mich. 42, 163 N. W. 70, A. C. 1918 E 217
(1917); Schofield's Will, 129 N. Y. S. 190 (Sur., 1911); McGhesney's
Will, 194 N. Y. S. 893 (1922); Pattison's Will, 140 N. Y. S. 478 (1912);
Pemberton v. Pemberton, 13 Ves. 290 (1805) (see note in 48 A. I. R.
297), and see O'Neall v. Farr, supra, n. 49, and 22 Col. L. Rev. 684
(1922).
"Pattison's Will, supra, n. 58. The declarations of the testator
are generally admissible in evidence to prove whether certain acts to
the document were or were not intended to be revocatory. Steele v.
Price, 44 Ky. 58 (1845); Sanders v. Babbitt, 106 Ky. 646, 51 S. W. 163
(1889);Stuart v. McWhorter, 238 Ky. 82 (1931). Court expressly dis.
agrees with the contrary view expressed in Throckmorton v. Holt, 180
U. S. 552 (1900). See Managle v. Parker, 75 N. H. 139, 71 A. 637
(1908), A. C. 1912; Re Kennedy, 167 N. Y. 163, 60 N. E. 442 (1901);
Drury's Will, 22 N. B. R. 318 (Can., 1882). See further references
and notes in 10 Ann. Cas. 535 and citations also to a small minority
of cases taking the view that these declarations are not admissible.
See also I Page on Wills, Secs. 779, 780; I Williams on Executors
(12th ed., 1930), p. 96. Skipwith v. Gabell, 19 Gratt. 758, 787 (1870);
U. S. Guaranty Go. v. Garter, 134 Ky. 374, 120 S. W. 328 (1909);
Harris v. Davis, 1 Coll. 416 (V. C., 1844); Be Hopkins, 172 N. Y. 360,
65 N. E. 173 (1902); Smith v. Hunkle, 97 A. 296 (N. J. Prerog., 1915);
Woerner, Sec. 49; Black v. Jobling, supra, n. 39; Paige v. Brooks, 75
K. L. J.-2
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jury.60 If the testator has both copies and preserves one, there
is presumably no revocation.6 '
It does not seem a desirable practice to execute duplicates.
The preservation of a carbon copy by the draftsman to estab-
lish the contents in the event that the will should be lost (where
there was no revocatory intent) is well enough, but a duplicate
gives rise to problems which unnecessarily complicate the mat-
ter, and makes the outcome difficult to predict under the vary-
ing circumstances that may possibly arise. Thus, testator may
well fail to preserve carefully his own duplicate, because he
knows there is another in the attorney's files, and he may de-
stroy one of the two in his possession, forgetting that he has
another, or believing that the destruction of one is sufficient as
a complete revocation.
2. THE CONCURRENCE OF AcTs AND INTENT
It is usually held that the act to the document must be
caused by the testator and in his presence and done with intent
to revoke in order to constitute a revocation.62 In fact, the
whole doctrine of dependent relative revocation has been built
L. T. N. S. 455 (1896); 3 Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1737, favoring
such admission as evidence of a state of mind.
But declarations of the testator as to the contents of lost wills are
more generally not admitted (In re Kent's Will, 155 N. Y. S. 894
(App. D., 1915); quaere as to the rule in England, Sugden v. Lord St.
Leonards, L. R. 1 P. D. 154, 205-6 (1876); Woodward v. Gaulstone,
L. R. 11 App. C. 469 (1886); and Williams, op. cit. and 3 Wigmore,
Sec. 1736, dealing with them as hearsay and suggesting here a possible
exception to the hearsay rule. With respect to duplicates, where the
one in the possession of the testator only has been lost, proof of tes-
tatrix' declarations that her will was in another place (where dupli-
cates were) was admitted to show that there was no intent to revoke,
Pattison's Vill, supra, n. 58, but it has also been held that if both
duplicates were in testator's possession and one only was preserved,
evidence of testator's declaration that he intende!R to revoke the entire
will was inadmissible. Atkinson v. Morris (1897), P. 40; Hubbard v.
Alexander, supra, n. 49 (holding that declarations of testator may be
used to establish that certain two wills are duplicates in a court of
construction), is said by Jarman [I Jarman, p. 470, n. (k)I to be ob-
viously erroneous. That is, the probate court must pass upon the
issue whether instruments are duplicates, over which issue a court
of construction has no original jurisdiction.
OManagle v. Parker, supra, n. 59.
See I Jarman on Wills, pp. 132-4.
"'Shield's Will, 190 N. Y. S. 562 (Sur., 1921); Atkinson. v. Morris,
supra, n. 59 (Duplicate preserved is not revoked, as a rule of law,
though testator intended a revocation of both). See also Roberts v.
Round, 3 Hagg. 548; 162 Reprint 1258 (Eccl., 1830). But cf. Doe V.
Strickland, supra, n. 49. See 35 Harv. L. Rev. 626, note (1922).
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upon that footing.6 3  Thus, where testator's wife destroyed the
will without authority, the act could not be ratified by him.6
Some American courts, while admitting that an act unaccom-
panied by intent to revoke, is ineffective, still take the view
that an act destructive of the physical integrity of the instru-
ment, done without knowledge or consent of the testator may
be ratified by him. It is assumed that he ratifies the act and
thus impliedly revokes the will if he has knowledge and an
opportunity to correct or repair the results of the act or event
and does not do so. Thus, after a will had been mutilated by
vermin, it was held that testator might accept the act as his
own as a revocation. 65 So a will lost to the knowledge of testa-
tor has been held revoked, 66 because the court infers a revoca-
tion by destructive act of the testator. In Wisconsin it was held
that a will inadvertently destroyed by fire to the knowledge of
the testator was revoked. The testator was said to have in-
tended to die intestate because he did not seize upon the oppor-
tunity of executing another6T This result cannot be reached,
it seems, without ovtrthrowing the rule that animus must ac-
company the act. Professor Page points out68 that a problem
different from revocation may arise where the requirements of
statutory proof of a lost will prevent the establishment of an
unrevoked will.
3. PARTIAL REVOCATION
Both the Statute of Frauds and the Wills Act, in providing
for the methods of revocation of a will include "or any clause
thereof". Thirty-three American states have similar language
6'I Page on Wills, Sec. 419.. Consent must be given while he
is compos mentis, Allison v. Allison, 37 Ky. 90 (1838).6, Gill v. G-ill (1909), P. 157. See also Miles v. Millward, 15 P. D. 20
(1889) (Will destroyed without testator's consent and she refused to
execute another-no revocation); Margary v. Robinson, 12 P. D. 8
(1886) (Erasure by the attesters of their signatures without the con-
sent of the testator); Estate of Patterson, 155 Cal. 626, 102 P. 941,
26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 654 (1909) (will destroyed in earthquake without
knowledge of testator, not revoked). See Deering, Probate Code of
California, Sec. 380 (1931), and see Olmstead's Estate, 122 Cal. 224,
54 P. 745 (1898); Barnes v. Brownlee, 97 Kan. 517, 155 P. 962 (1916).
0Culter v. Culter, 130 N. C. 1, 40 S. E. 689 (1902). See I Page on
Wills (2nd ed., 1926), Secs. 425 and 635.
'Deaves' Appeal, 140 Pa. St. 242, 21 A. 395 (1891); Campbell v.
Cavanaugh, 96 N. J. Eq. 724, 125 A. 569 (1923).
r, Parson v. Balson, 129 Wis. 311, 109 N. W. 136 (1906). Contra, re
Booth (1926), Prob. 118.
0 Op. cit., Secs. 425 and 635; 22 Ky. L. Jour. 469, 497-8 (1934).
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and it is commonly assumed that the addition of this phrase
contemplates the possibility of partial revocation. New York
alone, of these states0 9 which have such a clause, denies effect
to an act of partial revocation.7 0 Of the remaining fifteen
states, three have emphatically declared against it3 1 It is in-
sisted that the absence of such a phrase means something. Some
of these fifteen have affirmed the possibility of partial revoca-
tion.7 2
No state permits partial revocation where it results in a
change of construction of what remains or increases a provi-
sion for another.7 3 In that respect partial revocation is similar
to striking out words of a -will written by mistake. There is a
conflict whether partial revocation may increase the residuary
clause. The argument favoring partial revocation, even though
that which falls into the residuary clause is thereby increased, is
supported by analogies: (a) lapsed provisions; (b) gifts to
persons dead when the will is executed; (c) provisions that
10 See 14 Ia. L. Rev. 290 (1929).1'0LovelZ v. Quitman, 88 N. Y. 377 (1882). The statute declares in
the first clause that no will . . . "nor any part thereof" shall be re-
yoked otherwise than by some writing, etc., or unless such will (stat-
ute here omits "or any part thereof"), be burnt, etc. Court says that
the phrase does not carry over to the second clause. In SimreZlls
Estate, 154 Pa. 604, 26 A. 599 (1893), it seems that Pennsylvania did
not'permit an erasure of a part to be effective, but it is not a decision
against partial revocation. The states whose statutes contain this
phrase as given by Bordwell in the Iowa Law Review are: Arizona,
Arkansas (Jeffett v. Cook, supra, n. 4), California (Wikman's Estate,
supra, n. 14), Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland [Home v. Bantz, 107 Md. 543, 69 A. 376 (1908)];
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hanipshire,
New Jersey [Kirkpatrick's Will, 22 N. J. Eq. 463 (1871)], New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma [In re Cabler's Estate, 124
Okla. 275, 257 P. 757 (1927)], Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Caro-
lina, South Dakota, Texas [Schnable v. Henderson, 152 S. W. 231 (Tex.
C. A. 1912)], Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
Wyoming. The states, consequently, which omit this phrase from their
statutes are:. Alabama [Law v. Law, 83 Ala. 432, 3 So. 752 (1888)],
Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia [Hartz v. Sobel, 136 Ga. 565, 71 S. E.
995 (1911)], Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Maine, Minnesota, Ne-
vada, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, Vermont, and also the
District of Columbia.
"3Law v. Law and Hartz v. Sobel, supra, n. 70; Coghlin v. Coghlin,
79 Oh. St. 71, 85 N. E. 1058 (1908).
3Miles' Appeal, 68 Conn. 237, 36 A. 39 (1896) (dictum); Bigelow
v. Gillett, supra, n. 33; Penniman's Will, 20 Minn. 245 (1874) (infer-
ence).
13,sclhbach v. Collins, 61 Md. 478 (1884); Home v. Bantz, supra,
n. 70; , ae Deposit Go. v. Thorn, supra, n. 25; Pringle v. McPherson,
2 Brev. 279 (S. C., 1809), but cf. Swinton v. Bailey, 4 App. Cas. 70
(1878).
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fail because of tbieir illegality; 74 (d) provisions too indefinite to
have effect ;7r (e) cases of disclaimer; and (f) gifts made in the
will and revoked by codicil without further disposition of them.7 6
The residuary clause is a testamentary device designed to catch
everything not otherwise disposed of and the increase in it
arising from partial revocation by act to the instrument can no
more be properly said to be lacking sufficient execution than
any other provision which at the time of execution it potentially
contains.77 There has never been any doubt about the possi-
bility of partial revocation under the English statutes,73 and the
residuary clause may thus be increased.79
Provisions may be made in three situations: (a) a gift is
provided for one beneficiary and is revoked; (b) provision is
made for two or more joint beneficiaries and the name of one
is stricken; (e) a legacy or devise is made to tenants in com-
mon and the name of one is eliminated.
The first affects only the residuary clause. In the second,
Tevocation has the same effect as a lapse and the gift goes to the
1 Cruikshank v. Home, 113 N. Y. 337, 21 N. B. 64 (1889).
15Re Bonnet, 113 N. Y. 522, 21 N. E. 139 (1889).
,6 Giddings v. Giddings, 65 Conn. 149, 32 A. 334 (1894).
"Bigelow v. Gillott, supra, n. 33 (leading case); Collard v. Collard,
,67 A. 190 (N. 3. Prerog., 1907) (Entire estate to Wife for life or until
she remarries, remainder over. Wife's "name erased and all goes over);
Brown v. Brown, 91 S. C. 101, 74 S. B. 135 (1912) (erasure of five
legacies, but the original was still legible); Home v. Bantz, supra, n. 70;
In re Kent's Will, 155 N. Y. S. 894 (App. D., 1915); Barfield v. Carr,
169 N. C. 574, 86 N. E. 498 (1915) (Residue divided among numerous
'beneficiarles and several of them were canceled. These canceled con-
tinue in the residuary clause by virtue of statutory provision). Contra,
Miles' Appeal, supra, n. 72; Knapen's Will, infra, n. 122 (inferentially).
By statute in Kentucky, the revoked provision, though not otherwise
-disposed of, does not go into the residuary clause, Carroll's Ky. Stat-
utes (1930), Sees. 4843 and 2064.
,8 Goods of Cooke, 5 Notes of C. 390 (Bee., 1847); Clarke v. Scripps,
.supra, n. 28; Goods of Woodward, L. R. 2 P. & D. 206 (1871).
19 Larkins v. Larkins, 3 B. & P. 16 (C. P., 1802). In addition to re-
voking a devise, there was also a revocation of the devise to one of
the two joint tenants named in the residuary devise. It was held that
the other would take the entire devise and that there was no increase
in the interest thus coming to a joint tenant. See also Short v. Smith,
4 East. 419 (K. B., 1803) (appointment of one of two executors re-
voked); Re Fleetwood, 15 Ch. D. 594 (1880) (one of two joint bene-
:iciarles attests, the other takes entire gift); 23 Harv. L. Rev. 558
(1910); 6 Mich. L. Rev. 272 (1908); 14 ib. 520 (1916); Ann. Cas.
1912 D 174; 38 L. R. A. (ns) 798, note 2; Williams (11th ed., 1921),
_p. 965. In Mason v. Methodist Church, 27 N. J. Eq. 47 (1876), a legacy
to four persons as tenants in common was made and by codicil the
gshare of one was revoked. The others held not to take the entire gift.
But see re Radcliffe, 51 W. R. 409 (Bug., 1903), and I Jarman, p. 157,
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survivors, under the rule that the gift is per tout et per my.
In the latter case the elimination of one should have no effect on
the others, and the result should be the same as in the case of a
lapse. Where partial revocation is not permitted, evidence is
sought as to the identity of the person eliminated, but if it
were not forthcoming there would be no total revocation. The
courses open to the court in the case of (c) are either to give tke,
whole bequest to the remaining beneficiaries or to give them only
what they originally were to receive, to regard the'entire provi-
sion as revoked, or to disregard the revocation. It is
arguable that the revocation should be disregarded because
testator ineffectively inserted the name of another or because,
he meant a thing he could not accomplish, viz., to increase the-
provisions for the others, and courts might be tempted, there-
fore, to apply the doctrine of dependent relative revocation.
Clearly the course should be followed of permitting the remain-
ing beneficiaries to take what the will gives them, where partial
revocation is possible, and let the revoked share fall into the
residue.
Where the statute is construed as forbidding partial revoca-
cation, the court. in such a state may be in a quandary where
there is no intent to revoke the entire will, and the part which
testator. attempted to revoke cannot be proved. This situation
becomes not unlike that under the English Wills Act, which
declares :80
"That no obliteration, interlineation, or other alteration . . . shall
have any effect except so far as the words or effect of the will' before
such alteration shall not be apparent, unless such alteration shall be
executed as hereinbefore is required for the execution of a will."
There is this difference, however, that under the no partial
revocation rule, proof of the contents of the destroyed or oblit-
erated part may be sought from the best evidence available, and
partial revocation may be thus avoided,81 while no such proof
would be admissible under the English statute.82
o St. 7 W. IV and I Vict. Ch. 26, Sec. XXI (1837).
19 In re Prescott, 4 Redf. 178 (Sur. N. Y.), but this does not include
declarations of testator. See In re Kent's Will, 155 N. Y. S. 894 (App.
D., 1915); Lang's Will, 30 N. Y. S. 388 (1894); Kissam's Will, 110
N. Y. S. 158 (Sur., 1908) (the erased provision could still be read);
Westbroolc's Will, 89 N. Y. S. 862 (Sur., 1904) (part had been cut out
and pasted in again); In re Crawford's Will, 142 N. Y. S. 1032 (N. Y.,
1913) (extensive alterations but original still legible). See also Hartz
v. Sobel, supra, n. 70.
1 Goods of Horsford, supra, n. 31. According to Bordwell, 1&
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The question whether the act to the document was intended
as a total or a partial revocation (in states where partial ievoca-
tion is permissible) is determined by the present condition of the
document, the part .obliterated or removed, and its relation to
what remains, and the oral declarations made at the time of the
act.8 3 The fact of the preservation of a will in its mutilated
condition is regarded as significant.8 4
Courts which deny the possibility of partial revocation
under the Statute still admit the necessity of it. Thus, if the
contents of what is removed cannot be established, the court is
obliged to probate what remains (partial revocation) or hold
that there is a total revocation.8 5  The problem is similar even
where partial revocation is permissible.8 6 Where there has been
a revocation of an integral legacy, specific or pecuniary, such
unknown provision must usually fall into the residue. But if
in the residuary clause there is a partial revocation of a pro-
vision for a fixed proportion to an integral legatee, this portion
will pass undisposed of by will.8 7
4. DEPENDENT" RELATIVE REVOCATION
The writer very largely agrees with the excellent article
of Professor Warren hereafter cited, in which he shows that
the term dependent relative revocation, while not inherently
devoid of meaning, yet is a confusion of two concepts, condi-
tional revocation and revocation under a mistake. The ques-
Ia. L. Rev. 289, there has been little tendency in the United States to
adopt Section 22 of the English Act to provide for the attestation of
cancellations and Iowa only is similar.
8'Leonard v. Leonard (1902), P. 243; 1 Page, Sec. 420; Clarke v.
Scripps, supra, n. 28; Overall v. Overall, 16 Ky. 50 (1821); Brow's
Will, 40 Ky. 56 (1840); Wells v. Wells, 20 Ky. 152 (1826).8 Russell v. Tyler, 224 Ky. 511, 6 S. W. (2d) 707 (1928); Goods of
Woodward, L. R. 2 P. & D. 206 (1871) (Declarations of testator made
at the time of the act are admissible).
s81Henry v. Fraser, 29 Fed. (2d) 633 (App. D. C., 1928) (will on two
sheets, second one containing the residuary clause only. The first was
removed. Held, entire revocation); Gugel v. Vallmer, 1 Dem. 484
(N. Y. Sur., 1883) (four of six pages removed. It is a question for the
jury whether entire revocation was intended); In re Curtis Will, 119
N. Y. S. 1004 (App. D., 1909) (details of a provision for F were torn
off. Contents unknown; no interlineations. Probate it as it stands);
Bescher's Estate, 229 N. Y. S. 821 (Sup. Ct., 1928) (same result. One
sheet removed, contents could not be proved).
OTownsend v. Howard, 86 Me. 285, 29 A. 1077 (1894) (Erasure
amounted to a total revocation); Leonard v. Leonard, supra, n. 83 (2
of 5 sheets removed caused a total revocation).
In re Kent's Will, supra, n. 59.
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tion arises, can further simplification of that confused concept
be made?
a. Situations to be Distinguished from Dependent Relative
Revocation
With respect to revocation by physical act to the document,
certain distinctions should be drawn at the outset, before the re-
maining situations to which dependent relative revocation is
applicable can be ascertained.
Thus, it is not to be confused with (a) revival of a revoked
will,88 since revival implies no absolute revocation at all but
a mere temporary displacement or suspension and a reinstate:
ment of the affected writing.89 The English and many American
statutes forbid revival save by codicil or by reexecution.9 0 It
should not include (b) revocation caused by mistake of motive
(mistake in the inducement) where no act creating a substitute
has been as yet performed, though one may be contemplated in
the indefinite future.91 The English cases hold that a will de-
stroyed because it was thought to be invalid or useless is not
revoked.9 2 Indeed, such cases are classed by Jarman with in-
8 In Goodright d. Glazier v. Glazier, 4 Burr. 2512, 98 Eng. Rep.
317 (K. B., 1770), Lord Mansfield indicated that if the testator had
destroyed the prior will, or if the later one had contained'a revocatory
clause, the former will would have been revoked (testator could not
have intended to revive a destroyed will); Burtenshaw v. Gilbert,
Cowper, 49, 98 Eng. Rep. 961 (1774) (Opinion by Mansfield. Where
the later cancelled will contained a revoking clause and the former
cancelled but not destroyed, will was not revived).
But see Cornish, Dependent Relative Revocation, 5 So. Cal. L.
Rev. 273, 393 (1931); Dickinson v. Swartman, 4 Sw. & Tr. 205 (Ecel.,
1860) (where the problem was regarded as one of revival, but the de-
cision was later overruled).
90 (A question of dependent relative revocation may arise, however,
where the revocation has for its object the revival of a prior will which
the testator mistakenly assumes to be possible.)
9LFrothingham's Will, supra, n. 13; Bethell v. Moore, 19 N. C. 311(1837) (It is a jury question).
' 1 Jarman, p. 133; Perrot v. Perrot, 14 East. 23 (K. B., 1811)(appointment by deed. Name cut from deed because the power was
erroneously believed to be exercised by a later will); Beardsley v.
Lacey, 78 L. T. N. S. 25 (1897) (will believed useless); Giles v. Warren,L. R. 2 P. & D. 401 (1872) (will torn up because testator had been
told it was invalid. He later pieced the parts together); Stamford v.
White (1901), P. 46 (testator erroneously believed that the purposes
of the will would be accomplished by a prior settlement); Goods of
Thornton, 14 P. D. 82 (1889) (testator believed same results would
accrue by intestacy); Goods of Moresby, 1 Hagg. 378, 162 Eng. Rep.
,619 (Eccl., 1828) (testator made later nuncupative will mistakenly,
'believing prior will had been accidentally destroyed).
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advertent destruction and with destruction by an insane or
drunken testator, though the cases sometimes speak of these acts
of revocation as being conditional.9 3 Jarman distinguishes these
from dependent relative revocation and implies that there is no
revocation in such cases at all. (c) The rule against partial
revocation in many states will also account for the numerous de-
-cisions in this country.94 Sometimes the rule against- partial
revocation reaches the same result as would dependent relative
revocation and relieves the court from invoking the latter doe-
trine.9 5 Partial revocation is, to a limited extent, possible under
the English Wills Act, and if the question be one of partial
revocation and the affected part is not apparent, it is not there-
after established by other evidence, -but if the revocation is
dependent, any evidence available is admissable to establish
the original .of the affected part.96 Partial revocation may
also fail, not because the act is dependent, but because to
allow a revocation would be to increase some other provision
(not residuary) of the will.9 7 The only alternatives are to
allow the whole will to fail, to reform it, or to probate it as it
originally was written. A difficult case may arise where there
is no evidence as to what the original provision was and and so
it may. not be known whether the revocation increased some
other provision or not. The doctrine may also (d) be regarded
as inapplicable in those cases in which the courts declare that
in the absence of some explanation of the origin and significance
of a cancellation or alteration, the cancellation or alteration is
to be ignored and the will is to be probated as originaly' ex-
ecuted.. s Finally, (e) the writer believes that it should not be
"Re Southerden, 133 L. T. R. 505 (C. A., 1924).
" See e. g. Lang's Will, supra, n. 81; McPherson v. Clark, 3 Bradf.
(N. Y. Sur.) 92 (1854); Quinn v. Quinn, 1 Thomp. & C. 437 (N. Y.,
1873); and prior discussion on partial revocation.
"Lang's Will, supra, n. 81.
"Goods of Horsford, supra, n. 31; Goods of McCabe, L. R. 3 P. & D.
94 (1873).
"Jackson v. Holloway, 7 Johns 394 (N. Y. c. 1. 1811); McPherson
v. Clark, supra, n. 102; Pringle v. McPherson, 2 Brev. 279 (S. C., 1809).
'"Means v. Moore, Harp. 314 (S. C., 1824); Farris v. Wyatt, 113 Va.
254, 74 S. D. 189 (1912) (Erasures must be shown to have been made
by testator after execution of the will or under circumstances tending
to show that he intended a revocation); city Natz. Bank v. Slocum,
272 Fed. 11 (C. C. A. 6th, 1929) ("In trust for" was cancelled, pre-
sumably by testator but no effect was given to the cancellation, though
dependent relative revocation was not suggested. The court questioned
the sufficiency of the probate decree in not clearly finding whether or
not these words were a part of the will).
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applied to the cases where the revocation occurs only by a val-
idly executed subsequent instrument which is inoperativeY9 .
b. Revocation by Subsequent Instrument. The Roman
Law Ride
So-called dependent relative revocation by subsequent in-
strment has been dealt with elsewhere.' 0 0 It is assumed here
that if the subsequent instrument contains a revoking clause,
the earlier will is unconditionally revoked. I shall therefore
consider those cases where the subsequent instrument is validly
executed, contains no revocatory clause, and is inoperative (at
least as to those provisions about which the question of revoca-
tion arises). As defined by Williams,' 0 ' the doctrine of de-
pendent relative revocation is applicable where an act of de-
stroying, being done with reference to another act (a substitute
by new instrument or by interlineation) meant to be an effectual
disposition, will be a revocation or not, according as the relative
act is efficacious or not. The revoking act is the dependent act
and the proposed new disposition is the relative act.
While this definition is possibly broad enough to include-
the case where the new disposition also contains the only revoca-
tion, still to limit its application to the case where the dependent
act is an act to the document seems to conform to the definition
much more appropriately. Both Williams and Jarman speak
of the revocation as being done by an act of destruction. How
can one separate the dependent act, revocation by inconsistent
words, from the relative act, the new disposition, if they are a
part of the same writing? Professor Warren assumes, however,
that the problem is identical whichever of the two methods is
employed, and that the application of the doctrine should de-
pend upon intention rather than upon a legal rule.
I have tried to show' 0 2 that it is simpler to disregard the.
doctrine in the case of revocation by subsequent instrument, at
least in most cases. That is to say the will which is allegedly
revoked in this fashion is not revoked at all, by a later, con:
"Discussed in 22 Ky. L. Jour. 469, 481-494.
'" See e. g., Evans in 22 Ky. L. Jour. 469, 490 (1934); Warren in
33 Harv. L. Rev. 337 (1920); Cornish in 5 So. Cal. L. R.. 273, 393
(1931).
1011 Williams on Executors (12th ed., 1930), p. 92; I Jarman on
Wills (7th ed., 1930), p. 79.
I'QSpra, n. 88.
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sistent instrument. It merely becomes inoperative In case the
later will is effective, but continues operative where the later
will, though validly executed, is ineffective because of some rule
of law. If the later will is wholly inconsistent, it revokes the
prior one just as clearly as it would if it contained a revoking
clause, but to the extent that it is consistent, it does not revoke.
In cases where the later, ineffective disposition puts qualifica-
tions upon the earlier disposition but is essentially similar in
other respects, the court is faced with a problem of construction.
Two further points of distinction should be noted between
revocation by a subsequent valid but inoperative instrument
and revocation by act to the document. (a) There is in the
first case a valid, even if ineffective substitute which is never
true where the revocation is by act to the document (or if there
is, then the question of revival, rather than dependent relative
revocation is raised); (b) the rule of the Roman law, "That a
prior will is revoked only when the later one is completed," was
adopted by the common law lawyers, but applied only in the
second situation.' 03 In English law, the Roman law rule, "The
earlier will is not revoked until a later one is completed", seems
to have had a considerable influence before and at the time the
doctrine of dependent relative revocation was being formu-
lated.' 0 4  This Roman law rule was applied (misapplied) in
cases where the revocation was by act to the document, and
the later will was sufficiently executed to revoke but not to pass
property (inasmuch as the Statute of Frauds did not require
an attested revocation). 10-5 It was declared by Weldon, J., in
Drury's WilT o, 0 6 that this civil law rule became the rule of the
English law applicable where the intent to revoke an earlier
will concurred with the further intent to make a new disposi-
20Limbery v. Mason, infra, n. 105 (the case came up from the
prerogative court and two doctors joined in the final opinion).
1 Dig. Lib. 28, tit. 3, s. 2. Tune prius testamentum rumpitur cum
posterius perfectum est. See also Inst. Lib. 2, tit. 17, Cautum est ne
alias tabulae priores jure factae irritae fiant nisi sequentes jure ordi-
nates et perfectae fuerint; nam, imperfectum testamentum rumpitur
sine dubio nullum est.
20-Limbery v. Mason, I Comyns 451, 92 Eng. Rep. 1155 (1734);
Onions v. TVrer, infra, n. 110 ex parte lchester, 7 Ves. 348, 32 Eng-
Rep. 142 (Exch., 1803) (will insufficiently executed, appointment of a
testamentary guardian held not to revoke a prior appointment, though
sufficiently executed to accomplish that pui~pose).
2" Drury's Will, supra, n. 59.
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tion, and that it made no difference whether the intended alter-
.ations were like or unlike the prior allegedly revoked provisions.
It is evident that there is no proper occasion for introducing
this rule of the Roman law into the common law. The execu-
tion of a will by a Roman had as its chief purpose the establish-
nent of a s-uus heres who should continue the personality of the
testator, and that purpose finds no place in Anglo-American
law.
c. Where New, Though Unexecuted Provisions, Are in
Existence
The testator may intend to make new provisions, substi-
tutes for the old, either by the execution of a new will or the
revival of an old one, by the removal of one or more pages and
the insertion of others, and by interlineations, the latter two
methods being frequent when only a partial revocation is de-
sired. In the case of interlineations, it is often held that there
is no absolute intent to revoke,10 7 and the same result is reached.
-where there is a substitution of pages if the contents of the
removed page can be proved.1 08 Little consideration in many
courts is given to the question whether there is a similarity be-
tween the revoked will and the substitute and the erasure of
the beneficiary's name and the insertion of that- of another
(unexecuted) as beneficiary of that legacy. It is frequently
held that this does not revoke where the original name can be
-established.10 9 If the invalid substitute is essentially like the
'"
TPenniman's Will, 20 Minn. 245 (1874) (interlineations present);
Hesterberg v. Clark, 166 Ill. 241, 46 N. E. 734 (1897); Hide v. Mason,
8 Vin. Abr. "Devise", p. 140 (1734) (Interlineations largely changed
scheme of dispositions. A new will, following mainly the terms of the
interlineations, was found unexecuted. Held, revoked); Dickinson v.
Stiiol-ph, 11 C. B. (N. S.) 341, 360, 142 Reprint 828, 836 (1861) (strik-
ing through and extensive interlineations said to be done to make way
for another disposition).
118 See e. g., Varnon. v. Varnon, 67 Mo. App. 534 (1896).
SSmith v. Runkle, 97 A. 296 (N. J. Prerog., 1915), affirmed 96
N. J. Eq. 257, 98 A. 1086; I Woerner See. 49; Strong's Appeal, 79
'Conn. 123, 68 A. 1089 (1906). (Here, however,.the later draft will took
away a life estate in premises, the fee of which had been given to a
brother, and purported to give the entire estate to the brother and the
former will was destroyed. Held, no revocation, but the similarity of
the two warrants that result); Wolf v. Bollinger, 62 Ill. 368 (1872);
Wells v. Wells, 20 Ky. 152 (1820) (Name of one executor erased and
another substituted); Laughton v. Atkins, 1 Pick. 535 (Mass., 1823)
("How can I know from the will itself that she would not have pre-
ferred that the first will should stand, rather than that the heirs-at-law
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revoked will, there is reason for applying dependent relative
revocation, whether the act should be regarded as conditional
or whether as Professor Warren suggests, revocation actually
has occurred, but is to be set aside on equitable grounds, the
essential similarity of the two.11
Frequently it is declared that a revocation by act to the
document is an equivocal act."' This accords with Professor
Warren's assumption that dependent relative revocation is and
should be a matter of intention. Just what sort of evidence,,
however, will resolve the doubt is seldom clear. A close simi-
larity between the new and the old may well determine that
there was no absolute intent to revoke.'1 2 Proof of a wide varia-
tion of the later ineffectual disposition from the earlier one
should resolve the doubt in favor of giving effect to the revoca-
tory act.
d. The Substitute is Contemplated Only
In contrast with the cases where the testator has prepared.
a substitute (invalidly executed) either by way of interlinea-
tions or by separate writing, are those cases where a substitute
should enjoy the estate?"); Thompson's Appeal, 114 Me. 338, 96 A. 238,
(1915); Smith v. Runkle, supra; Jackson v. Holloway, supra, n. 97;
Penniman's Will, 20 Minn. 245 (1874) (see also Varnon v. Varnon,
supra, n. 108, where testator had become dissatisfied with his will,
which provided for his sister and desired to have the property go-
rather to his wife and son. He tore out one page and substituted an-
"other, which was unexecuted. Dependent relative revocation caused
that disposition to stand which he had sought to avoid. Intestacy-
would have accomplished approximately the desired distribution). See.
I Page on Wills, See. 450, pp. 727-728.
n*Wilbourn v. Shell, 59 Miss. 205 (1881); In re Battis, 143 Wis.
234, 126 N. W. 9 (1910) (will rewritten in order to correct its spelling-
and make it more legible and old will destroyed); Onions v. Tyrer,
2 Vern. 742 (Ch. 1717). Compare West v. West 2 I. R. 34, 55 Ir. L. T.
xxviii (1921); Estate of Irvine, 25 T. L. R. 41 (1908), and Clarkson v.
Clarkson, 2 Sw. & Tr. 498 (Eccl., 1862) (destroyed will was held re-
voked and nothing was said about the similarity of the intended sub-
stitutes).
mOverall v. Overall, supra, n. 83 (Date erased and earlier date In-
serted, which change of date the court thinks has a revocatory effect,.
but it is disregarded, because no intent to revoke); Brown's Will,
supra, n. 83; Pennimai's Will, supra, n. 109; Bethell v. Moore, 119 N. C.
311 (1837) (court says that the revocation of the earlier will was de-
pendent upon the validity of the later one); Means v. Moore, supra, n.
,98 ("man" cancelled "woman" inserted); Drury's Will, 22 N. B. 318S(Can., 1882) (the burden of proof is upon the one who asserts that
-the will was revoked in whole or in part); Powell v. Powell, L. R. 1
P. & D. 209 (1866); Burtenshaw v. Gilbert, 1 Cowper 49, 98 Eng. Rep
961 (1774).
-' Cases in n: 111, supra.
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is contemplated only, and in these cases the decisions are in
sharp conflict. The English decisions in general hold that such
a revocation is conditional,11 8 and that the act was performed
merely as a step preparatory to the execution of a later writing.
There is no apparent reason why such cases should be classified
as being affected by dependent relative revocation, inasmuch as
they might well be accounted for by the English result where
there is a mistake of motive.
By the terms of the definition there should be some act to
which the proposed revocation is related and on which it is
dependent.11 4 Where the relative act has been performed it
may be said that there is some logical basis (whatever one thinks
,of the result in individual cases) for its application, but where
the act rests merely in contemplation, it is genuinely difficult to
,discover any relative act upon which the prior act is dependent.
Is there any sufficient reason for going beyond Jarman and
treating such apparently independent acts as caused by mistake
of motive? According to the English cases as shown, mistake
of motive in revoking by act to the document causes the act to
'e ineffectual.
The American rule may be said to conflict with the Eng-
lish rule in this type of situation and to follow a sounder view 1 5
in a majority of cases. Thus, it is not clear why mistake of
motive should not on the one hand avoid a will, but should on
the other hand make void the revocation of a will. There may
"*Goods of Applebee, infra, n. 119; Goods of Weston, L. R. 1
P. & D. 633 (1869) (Testator destroyed his will without explanation.
Later the same day, he declared his intent to revive his former will.
Held, dependent relative revocation applies; Eeles' Goods, 2 Sw. & Tr.
600, 164 Eng. Rep. 1130 (Ecel., 1862) (Testator cut out the names of
the attesters, -saying at the time that he had some idea of executing
-a new will. Later the same day he pasted in the removed parts-de-
pendent relative revocation); Dixon v. Treasury Solicitor (1905), P. 42(Testator destroyed his will, intending to execute another, which was
never done-same rule). Burtenshaw v. Gilbert, supra, n. 88, and Dick-
inson v. Swatman, 4 Sw. & Tr. 205, 164 Eng. Rep. 1495 (Eccl., 1860).
"1 Thus, in Henry v. Frazer, supra, n. 85, the doctrine is inap-
plicable unless it is proposed to probate the allegedly revoked will.
n5 Olmstead's Estate, 122 Cal. 224, 54 P. 745 (1898); McIntyre v.
McIntyre, 120 Ga. 67, 47 S. E. 501 (1904); Sanders v. Babbitt, 106 Ky.
646, 51 S. W. 163 (1899) (mere intent to execute a later will does not
prevent giving effect to the revocatory act); Semmes v. Semmes, 7
H. & J. 388 (Md., 1826) ("In consequence of the death of my wife, It
becomes necessary to make a new will" which will was never made.
The implication is that the new will would differ materially from the
revoked will); Johnson v. Brailsford, 11 S. C. L. 272 (1820) (case Is
not satisfactory because it raises a question of revival of former will
.as a matter of Intention to be passed upon by a jury).
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be in these cases no evidence whatever as to the new disposition
testator intended to make, 118 or the testator may contemplate
a radically different disposition.117 Special emphasis should be
-laid upon this fact. Thus, to have held with the lower court in
re Frothingharn's Will 8 that there was a dependent relative
revocation, would reach a shocking result. Testator had created
various annuities and made his wife, who was the chief object
of his concern, his residuary beneficiary. After having suffered
.serious losses, he determined that his wife would be unprovided
for by his will in the present state of his affairs. He therefore
-struck through all the other items, and nothing remained except
the provision for the wife. He planned a new will upon the
basis of the old will thus mutilated, but it was never executed.
Relying on Goods of Applebee," 9 the lower court reversed the
,Orphan's Court's decree and held that the will should stand as
if no partial revocations had been made, but the Court of Errors
-and Appeals held that the canceled provisions were revoked.
'The fact that testator meant to execute another, using the old
will with its alterations as a model, made no difference. This
seems so clearly sound that one wonders how the Prerogative
Court could have reached any other conclusion. The mere in-
tention, therefore, to execute a will in the future is generally in-
,sufficient in this country to prevent the revoking act from
operating. 120
"Semmes v. Semmes, supra, n. 115.
21 Townshend v. Howard, supra, n. 86; Drury's Will, supra, n. 59.2"8 Supra, n. 13.
"' 1 Hagg. 143, 162 Eng. Rep. 536 (Eccl., 1828) (Testator had made
'certain alterations and desired a new will drawn conforming to it as
.altered. New will never executed. Held, old will conditionally revoked.
Nothing here to show the extent of the alterations); Powell v.
Powell (L. R. 1 P. & D. 209, 1866) (testator destroyed later will, be-
queathing all his property to his nephew, intending to revive his
former will. It does not appear who was the beneficiary under the
revoked will, but inferentially it was not his nephew. Held, later will
-only conditionally revoked).
'I Brown's Will, supra, n. 83 (Testator partially revoked his will.
He intended to make a new one, but feared that he might die prior
to its execution, and so left the emancipation provision untouched.
Held, will partially revoked); Sanders v. Babbitt, 106 Ky. 646, 51 S. W.
163 (1899); Tofbnshend v. Howard, supra, n. 86 (There was evidence
that testator meant to make a new but radically different will; Re
Allen's Will, 89 N. J. Eq. 208, 102 A. 147, 103 A. 1051 (1918) (court
says there is a tendency in the decisions hostile to the extension of
the doctrine); In re Emernecker's Estate, 218 Pa. 369 (1907) (will
believed invalid was destroyed and testator intended later to make
another); Johnson v. Brailsford, 11 S. C. L. 272 (1820) (Jury found
an intent to revoke); supra, n. 115.
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e. Cancellations and Interlineations Reducing the
Gift or Changing the Beneficiary
There are some special illustrations of cancellations and in-
terlineations which call for comment. Suppose the testator
cancels the first legacy and inserts another at the end of his
dispositions. There is no occasion to say that the two acts are
related. There should be the same result if the insertion were
made direcVly after the cancellation, there being no relation be-
tween the two acts, separate provisions having been made to
separate beneficiaries. Does it make any difference that the
name of one beneficiary is cancelled and that of another is in-
serted where the legacy remains the same? There are three
situations. Goods of Horsford121 illustrates two of them. (a) In
the will a paper had been pasted over the name of the" donee,
with a substituted donee written thereon, so that the original
was no longer apparent, and (b) a similar act was done to the
codicil where only the legacy was covered up and a different sum.
had been written above the original sum. The court regarded
(b) as involving dependent relative revocation but not (a). This
is a valid distinction. In (a) we find, in substance, a new gift
to a new legatee, but in (b) we find a part of the original gift
intended for the original legatee. In the first, therefore, there
is no relation or dependency between the two acts and in the
latter there is. The third situation (c) may arise as in Knapen'&
*Will,122 where there is a complete cancellation of both gift and
donee and substitutions written above each. This seems in-
distinguishable in'result from situation (a), there being no dif-
ference between shifting a gift from A to B and the insertion
of a new gift for B.
Since in (b) effect cannot be given to the smaller sum in:
serted and the testator did not wish to omit this beneficiary en-
tirely, there is some basis for applying dependent relative revo-
cation. The cover is removed, not for the purpose of making
apparent that which is not apparent [as would have been the
case if the covering had been removed in (a)), but rather for
inL. R. 3 P. & D. 211 (1874). See also In re Knapen's Will, 7M
Vt. 146, 53 A. 1003 (1903). (It seems inter alia that figures fixing the
amount of certain legacies had been cancelled and different figures
(increasing the amount) were inserted and the name of certain legatees
were cancelled and other names inserted in the margin).
Aupra, n. 121.
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the purpose of procuring the most reliable evidence of what the
original provision was. Even oral evidence is permitted as to
the original provision where it is available. In (a) there is no
occasion to apply dependent relative revocation unless perhaps
it should turn out that the name of the beneficiary was identi-
cal with the one ineffectively written in, which would make the
act purposeless. 23 It must be admitted that there are decisions
applying dependent relative revocation even where there is a
change of both beneficiary and the amount of the gift.12 4 Where
the amount of a legacy has been reduced but the gift otherwise
remains, there seems to be no exception to the rule laid down
in Locke v. James, 25 that dependent relative revocation ap-
plies.126
The possibility of a new type of partial revocation by way
of reduction may be suggested. In Locke v. James, the tes-
tator made a gift of six hundred pounds which he later desired
to alter to two hundred pounds. This was done by a stroke
through "six" and writing an unattested "two" above it. If
this is to be construed as an act of destruction accompanied by
an act of creation, as the courts have invariably regarded the
transaction, the purpose cannot be carried out, as the act of
creation must be attested. If testator had used the symbols two
hundred plus two hundred plus two hundred, the possibility of
reduction by cancellation is unquestionable under the statute
then in force. "Six" is a symbol known as a phonogram just
as f'6" is an ideogram, but they are not susceptible as are th.e
other symbols of reduction, by partial elimination of the symbol.
To omit a part of "six" or of "6" leaves a meaningless quantity.
Perhaps the ideogram "8" could be so mutilated as to leave the
ideogram "3" and the ideogram "4" could be so mutilated as
Professor Warren, in 33 Harv. L. Rev. 337, 345, n. 32, thinks the
distinction unjustifiable. Naturally, it would be difficult to say that
£10,000 reduced to £1 indicated dependent relative revocation. It is
hard to speculate in advance just to what amount of alteration that
doctrine should apply.
3'4 e. g. Wolf v. Bollinger, supra, n. 109; Stever v. Kendall, 1 Cold.
557 (Tenn., 1860); Pringle v. McPherson, supra, n. 73 (Knapen's Will,
supra, n. 121)..
111 M. & W. 901 (Exch., 1843). See also Kirke v. Kirke, 4 Russ.
435, 38 Reprint 868 (Ch., 1828), and Short v. Smith, supra, n. 79.
2" See among others, Gardner v. Gardner, 65 N. H. 230, 19 A. 651
(1890); Brooke v. Kent, 3 Moore P. C. 334 (1840) (attempt to reduce
£200 to £100 and £400 to £200).
K. L. J.-3
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to leave the ideogram "1", though similar mutilations in the
corresponding phonograms would not be possible.
Both oral and written language consists of symbols. Many
of these symbols are words and it is an essential of a word that
it be pronounceable. A word consists of a group of letters in
the same way that a sentence consists of a group of words and
so each consists of a group of symbols. The significance of sym-
bol groups consists as well in the order in which the symbols
are placed as in the separate meanings of the symbols. So ideas
may be expressed by both phonograms (words) and ideograms
(non-pronounceable symbols) such as 1, 2 and the symbols for
"plus", "times", "divided by", etc.
As said above, sometimes a change in the meaning of a
written sentence may be made by simply striking out a part of
the symbols. If a testator had before him six hundred pounds
which he meant to give to X and then changed his mind and
decided to give him two hundred instead, he would not remove
the entire six hundred and put in its place two hundred pounds.
He would rather remove four hundred and thus leave two hun-
dred. Can this process be shown intelligibly by a possible sym-
bol, to be a reduction, a simple act, rather than two acts, one of
destruction and another of creation? If it were desired to re-
duce "$500" or "five hundred dollars" to "$5" or "five dol-
lars" it can be done by striking the symbols, the zeros, or the word
"hundred'.127 The stroke is itself a simple, uncompounded sym-
bol, but since it is not appropriate for the reduction of "6" or
"six" to "2" ) or-" two ", a complex symbol, to represent how-
ever a simple act, becomes necessary. It consists in Locke v.
James (a) of the stroke through the word "six", (b) the in-
sertion of the word "two", and (c) the spacial relation between
them.' 28
"" Tudor v. Tudor, 56 Ky. 383 (1856) (The word "hundred" stricken
in two bequests respectively of "five hundred" and "seven hundred"
dollars). See Goods of Nelson, Ir. R. 6 Eq. 569 (1872) (dependent rela-
tive revocation applies, where a substituted figure was inserted,
whether of a smaller or larger amount, and evidence will be sought
to prove the original but where no substitution, there is a revocation,
save where the original Is legible).
It is assumed that of two possible analyses the simpler one io
preferable. Thus, in Locke v. James, reduction is simpler than de-
struction united with creation. Reduction is a simple negative act
subject to degrees. Nothing Is created. In reducing we do not subtract
the whole and then add one-third. We could do so and get the same
result, but the method is needlessly complex. To adopt the complex
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So in the converse case, where testator purports to revoke
by later codicil in order to increase the gift, e. g., strikes "$500"
and inserts "$700" there is no revocation, because the symbol is
not a symbol of reduction, but rather becomes a symbol of par-
tial creation, an addition to the original gift. 12 9
There is some analogy in certain cases where an allegedly
revoked legacy to charity was held only partially revoked.
Thus, if the testator gives by will a sum to charity and during
the period within which charitable bequests cannot be made he
revokes by words only the original legacy and gives "instead
thereof" a lesser sum, it has been held that there was in reality
only a reduction rather than a revocation, so that what is left
is provided in a will appropriately executed with respect to
time. 130
CONCLUSION
It is observable that the American statutes on revocation by
act to the document are much looser than the English statutes
where such a revocation is possible only when the original provi-
sions are not apparent. Duplicates aff6rd needless trouble and
the practice of execution of two wills should be discouraged,
preservation of a carbon copy being preferable. It is believed
that a statute which permits partial revocation (where no other
than the residuary clause is increased by it) accomplishes gen-
erally the purposes of testators. It is often inconvenient to re-
draft a will in cases where the elimination of certain provisions
may be desired. While the same result can be reached by sign-
ing, attesting and subscribing the alterations, the testator is
likely not to be aware of it. Acts of mutilation or destruction
not made at the behest of the testator should have no revocatory
effect under the general rule that a revocation requires animus
method violates a well known rule applied to scientific hypotheses called
'Occam's Razor," or the law of parsimony, "Entia non sunt multipli-
canda praeter necessitatem." In mathematics the corresponding prin-
ciple is that of "elegance." When a theorem can be proved in several
different ways, the mathematician generally prefers the simplest or
the most elegant proof; In the case of partial revocation, the remain-
ing provisions of the will are not recreated. So when a sum is partially
reduced, Is it reasonable to demand that the remainder of the sum be
recreated?
'-"'Carpenter v. Wynne, 252 Ky. 543, 67 S. W. (2d) 688 (1934)
(Court says there was no intent to revoke). Re Wilcox's Will, 20
N. Y. S. 131 (Sur., 1892) ("s" in seven erased and "el" replaced the
'"See 22 Ky. L. Jour. 469, 489-490 (1934).
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revocandi and an appropriate act, which in most cases must be
done at the instigation of and in the presence of the testator.
It will be a long time before the last word will be said con-
cerning dependent relative revocation. The misapplication of
the Roman law maxim had its influence. Since there is no gen-
eral agreement in this country respecting the situations for
which the doctrine becomes a useful device, this paper proposes
that its application be limited as follows: It applies (a) only
where the revocation is by act to the document; (b) only where
there is some substitute, either by way of interlineations or a
new writing, both unexecuted; and (c) only where the pro-
posed substitution is essentially similar to the rejected will or
provision. Thus, one excludes (1) revocation by an inoperative,
but well executed subsequent writing; (2) revocation by act to
the will where another writing is contemplated only; and (3)
revocation by act to the will where there is a substitution but
it is essentially dissimilar. One may also exclude (4) the case
where the testator desires to alter a legacy, which alteration he
seeks to accomplish by a stroke through the original sum and
by the writing of a lesser sum above it. The possibility of this
exclusion depends upon the transaction being regarded as a
reduction rather than a revocation and an attempted new crea-
tion. The desire of the testator thus becomes fully accomplished.
Many cases of revocation under a mistake of motive have
been treated as dependent or conditional. There appears to be no
sufficient reason why such cases should not follow the general
rule on mistake of motive in other types of unilateral transac-
tions. Dependent relative revocation should be regarded merely
as a device to secure desired ends and should be subject to modi-
fication from time to time according as it does or does not pro-
mote those ends. Statutory regulation of the application of it
may be desirable.
